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Introduction 
 13,488 terrorist attacks occurred around the world in 2016.i 1,468 of these, or 10.9%, 
were perpetrated by the Islamic State.1 The Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), is an extremely violent 
Islamist terrorist organization that follows Salafism, a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam. The 
group’s ultimate goal is to establish a worldwide caliphate, or a state governed by Islamic law. 
ISIS is rooted in Abu Musad al-Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Iraq, a militant organization so extreme 
and violent that even Al Qaeda’s leadership criticized its methods and eventually renounced 
connections with the group. When Zarqawi was killed by a U.S. airstrike in 2006, Abu Ayyub al 
Masri became the leader of the group and renamed it the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi succeeded Masri upon his death in 2010. As ISI began expanding into Syria, it took on 
the name the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. In 2014, Baghdadi announced the 
establishment of a worldwide caliphate with himself as the Caliph, or leader. With this 
declaration, the group adopted the name the Islamic State, viewing the name ISIS as too 
geographically limiting in its reference to Iraq and Syria, though the acronym ISIS is still 
commonly used globally.2 
The Islamic State subscribes to a Salafist ideology, a brand of Sunni Islam that advocates 
a return to true Islam, a crucial condition of which is the purification of Islam of Western 
influence. Many Salafists also view other types of Muslims, including Shias and Sufis, as 
“deviant” and impure.3 Though a majority of the world’s Salafists are nonviolent, ISIS has used 
                                                 
i Terrorism is defined by the Global Terrorism Database as “the intentional act of violence or 
threat of violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal 
through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” The database includes international, transnational, and 
domestic terror attacks.  
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this theology to justify violence against other non-Salafi Muslims, particularly Shias, and the 
West.4 The group uses “unparalleled levels of violence and brutality” in an attempt to achieve its 
goal of purifying Islam and restoring an Islamic Caliphate.5 At its height, the group controlled 
vast amounts of Iraqi and Syrian territory, an area encompassing an estimated 10 million people, 
although in the past year it has experienced major losses.6 ISIS has been able to recruit large 
numbers of individuals to join its cause, many of whom are foreign fighters, or individuals 
recruited from other nations to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria. In 2015, the Soufan Group, a security 
intelligence services company, estimated that between 27,000-31,000 people travelled to Syria 
and Iraq to join ISIS and other violent extremist groups (including IS affiliates) in the region.7 A 
senior official in the FBI, Michael Steinbach has asserted that “no group has been as successful 
at drawing people into its message as ISIL”, and Matthew Olsen, director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center, agrees that ISIS “operates the most sophisticated propaganda machine 
of any terrorist organization.”8 
The Islamic State has proven to be one of the most effective terrorist groups at recruiting 
new members that exists. Why is the Islamic State so appealing? What has made this group so 
effective at recruitment? What methods does it employ to recruit so many individuals? This 
paper answers these questions by examining three explanations of recruitment commonly 
referenced in the current literature: strategic targeting, online recruitment, and kinship 
recruitment. These were analyzed through case studies of ISIS fighters. This analysis revealed 
that both strategic targeting and kinship recruitment are strong explanations of the methods ISIS 
employs to recruit new fighters. 11 of the 12 individuals studied were particularly vulnerable in 
one way or another to radicalization and recruitment by the Islamic State, which supports the 
idea that strategic targeting is a strong explanation of how ISIS attracts new members. 10 of 12 
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of the individuals had kinship connections, which indicates that kinship recruitment is a valid 
explanation as well. Online recruitment applied to only 5 of the 12 individuals, suggesting that 
this is a moderately valid explanation of the Islamic State’s strategies of recruitment.  
This paper is comprised of several sections. The first describes the methodology used in 
this study and details each of the three explanations that were studied: strategic targeting, online 
recruitment, and kinship recruitment. A case-study design was used to analyze the ability of 
these methods to explain the Islamic State’s recruitment strategies. The cases of 12 individuals 
are described and analyzed through the lens of each of the three explanations in the second 
section of the paper. In the third section, the findings from this analysis are detailed. In the final 
section, the conclusion provides a brief summary of the study and presents several policy 
implications of and potential solutions to the issue of the Islamic State’s recruitment.  
 
Methods and Explanations 
 This study is based on case studies of individual fighters. In these case studies, I look at 
three explanations that are common in the existing literature on ISIS’ recruitment strategies: 
strategic targeting, online recruitment, and kinship recruitment. Strategic targeting involves 
capitalizing on individual’s vulnerabilities. Angela Gendron, a Senior and Research Fellow at a 
variety of institutions including the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies, has written 
extensively on how ISIS targets specific individuals who fit certain categories, including youth, 
those who are socially isolated, and those experiencing a crisis of identity. Syed Mansoob 
Murshed, a Professor of the Economics of Conflict and Peace at the Institute of Social Studies in 
The Hague, and Sara Pavan, a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of British 
Columbia, discuss the role that politics and socio-economic inequality play in radicalizing 
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individuals. Online recruitment, on which much has been written by Imran Awan, Deputy 
Director of the Centre for Applied Criminology at Birmingham City University, involves the use 
of the internet by a terrorist organization to spread its propaganda to massive numbers of people 
across the world. Both of Shiraz University in Iran, Khalil Sardarnia and Rasoul Safizadeh’s 
study of ISIS’ use of the internet is a key work in this field as well. Finally, the role of kinship in 
the recruitment of people to join terrorist organizations has been expounded upon thoroughly in 
relation to a variety of terrorist groups. Rukmini Callimachi, a New York Times journalist, has 
investigated the influence of kinship on pairs of siblings who have joined Islamist terrorist 
organizations, including ISIS. Thomas Neer, a senior associate at the Soufan Group who focuses 
on violent extremism, and Mary Ellen O’Toole, the FBI’s leading expert on psychopathy, have 
looked at how kinship influences foreign fighters, as well as at the use of the internet and 
exploitation of vulnerabilities to recruit individuals.  
 In the following section of the paper, these three explanations are detailed and then 
operationalized in order to determine how well they explain ISIS’ recruitment methods. A set of 
yes-or-no questions was devised to more narrowly define each explanation and facilitate the 
analysis of nine case studies. This enables each explanation to be quantified and thus easily 
compared.  
Methodology 
This paper employs a case-study method to evaluate three explanations of the Islamic 
State’s recruitment strategies through an examination of individuals who became members of the 
group. The lack of a public database of all foreign fighters necessitates a case-study analysis of a 
select number of individuals on whom information is available. These individual cases were 
chosen mainly from newspapers such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal due to 
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a lack of published scholarly articles on specific members of ISIS. After a review of the existing 
literature on the Islamic State’s recruitment, three methods that are commonly used to explain 
ISIS’ recruitment were chosen to be more deeply examined in this paper. The cases of six 
individuals and three pairs of siblings were analyzed using these methods to determine whether 
they are accurate explanations of the Islamic State’s recruitment. It must be noted that these 
explanations are not mutually exclusive; each may relate to one another. For example, several 
individuals met their boyfriends or husbands online and were radicalized through these men, 
which constitutes both online and kinship recruitment. In addition, the second and third 
explanations, online and kinship recruitment, are tools through which the Islamic State exploits 
people’s vulnerabilities detailed in the first explanation, strategic targeting.  
Explanation 1: Strategic Targeting 
 The first common explanation of ISIS’ recruitment methods is strategic targeting. The 
Islamic State carefully selects individuals who are susceptible to radicalization and exploits their 
vulnerabilities to recruit new members. A variety of factors make certain individuals prime 
targets for the Islamic State. Those vulnerable to radicalization include youth, individuals who 
are searching for some meaning or purpose in life, who feel a sense of anger and injustice at the 
discrimination and inequality they face and feel alienated from society, people who blame the 
West for problems in the Middle East, people who live in difficult circumstances, and either 
strongly religious individuals or recent converts to Islam. 
 Individuals under the age of 25 are prime targets of ISIS recruiters due to their 
impressionability and desire to find their place in the world, which means they can be easily 
swayed by the group’s messages. In addition, the prefrontal cortex, the “rational” area of the 
brain that plays a crucial role in planning, decision-making and social behavior and judgement, is 
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not typically fully developed until the age of 25 or 26, making people younger than this more 
susceptible to manipulative messages from ISIS.9 Such messages include the portrayal of ISIS as 
a utopia, an image that distorts the reality of life in Iraq and Syria.10 By depicting itself in this 
way, ISIS appeals to youth who are seeking adventure or who want a chance to be a hero, as well 
as those who are searching for some meaning or purpose in life. Being unemployed or having a 
menial, degrading, trivial, or meaningless job can contribute to this sense of a lack of purpose. 
Grappling with one’s identity, a rejection of parent’s authority, and distance from one’s religious 
roots are all common characteristics of adolescence that can be exploited by charismatic 
preachers and recruiters.11 Youth are also main targets of recruiters as they make up a large 
proportion of internet and social media users, which is a technique ISIS relies upon heavily to 
spread its ideology. 
People who face social and economic inequality due to race or religion are also 
susceptible to radicalization and recruitment by the Islamic State. Muslims and individuals of 
Middle Eastern heritage are largely discriminated against by “Western” nations including the 
United States and many countries in Europe. President Donald Trump has banned immigrants 
from several Muslim-majority nations from entering the United States, and in France 
approximately “70 percent of the prison population is Muslim,” though Muslims comprise only 
“7-8 percent of [the country’s] population.”12 Political rhetoric and the media have created a 
stereotypical image of Muslims as terrorists; this perception fosters prejudice, hatred, and 
misjudgment and mistreatment of Muslims. Anger at and frustration with this discrimination and 
inequality are often factors that lead to an individual’s radicalization. Discrimination also 
perpetuates an “‘us’ vs ‘them’ mentality”, dividing people into distinct groups.13 These divisions 
make it easier for individuals to legitimize prejudicial and discriminatory acts against these 
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“others”, creating a cycle that fosters hate that radical groups like ISIS can exploit. 
Discrimination can also result in feelings of alienation, rejection, and isolation among Muslims 
and individuals of Middle Eastern descent living in the West. ISIS appeals to these individuals 
by portraying the group as a close-knit society in which everyone can play an important role, a 
community unlike their home in the West.   
These feelings of anger at the West are magnified by ISIS’ claim that the West is to 
blame for various conflicts and issues in the Middle East. ISIS often explains to recruits that 
social and economic inequality are a result of Western influence. The British-French Sykes-Picot 
Agreement of 1916 arbitrarily carved the Middle East into separate spheres of influence during 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire with no regard for local communities, and is widely viewed 
as a source of contemporary issues. Other interventions such as the American invasion and 
subsequent occupation of Iraq in 2003 foster anti-Western and particularly anti-American 
sentiment in the region. Many Western foreign policies and alliances, such as the United States’ 
strong alliance with Israel, are viewed as anti-Islamic and contribute to the belief that the West is 
prejudiced against Islam.14 ISIS capitalizes on these sentiments to recruit followers, for example 
by claiming it is waging a “war against evil, morally corrupt Western forces that are trying to 
destroy Islam.”15 This resentment for various injustices of the West make individuals susceptible 
to radicalization by the Islamic State.  
Certain circumstances also make individuals vulnerable to radicalization. These include a 
poor home environment, limited work or employment opportunities, poverty, and other similar 
conditions. Turbulent, unstable home situations can lead individuals to turn their back on their 
family, to search for a supportive community with more coherent rules.16 The Islamic State 
offers individuals this support and clarity. Growing up economically poor or being currently 
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unemployed, particularly in countries where job opportunities may be limited because of 
discrimination, can make individuals desperate for work, which leaves them susceptible to 
recruitment. Certain jobs, such as those that are low-paying, inconsequential, or unskilled can 
make people desire something more. ISIS offers individuals in these types of jobs a clear 
purpose, an opportunity to do something more important and meaningful.  
 Finally, strongly religious people are vulnerable to radicalization as well, particularly if 
they hold conservative, purist beliefs that align with the radical views that ISIS espouses. 
However, recent converts to Islam are also targets because they are less knowledgeable of the 
religion and thus more malleable.17 When educating new Muslims, ISIS can indoctrinate them 
with their radical beliefs and emphasize the aspects of Islam that line up with their views and 
deemphasize or hide those aspects that do not. ISIS does this by presenting selective 
interpretations of the Quran. For example, the group has emphasized the line, “When you meet 
the unbelievers, smite their necks”, while ignoring the phrase “it is time for generosity” that 
appear just words after.18  
There are many factors that can make individuals susceptible to radicalization. Being 
young, lacking a sense of meaning or purpose in life, facing social and economic inequality and 
discrimination, feeling anger at a certain government or region or system, living in difficult 
circumstances, and having a strong traditional faith in Islam or little knowledge of the religion 
are all characteristics that can be exploited by radical terrorist groups such as the Islamic State. 
Though there may be other factors that also make people vulnerable to recruitment, the existing 
literature asserts that these factors play the most vital role in the process of radicalization and are 
thus the ones studied in this paper. 
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Explanation 2: Online Recruitment 
The second strategy that the current literature claims ISIS relies on to gain individuals is 
online radicalization and recruitment. The internet and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, and KIK are essential to ISIS’ great ability to recruit.19 Much of the organization’s 
contact with potential recruits is through the internet, which enables ISIS to expand its reach 
worldwide. The internet facilitates communication with people living in the West, who as 
previously described can be very vulnerable to radicalization. The ability to recruit individuals 
from abroad makes ISIS a dangerous organization; some of these individuals travel to Syria or 
Iraq to join the group, but others remain in their home countries to aid ISIS in carrying out 
attacks on its foreign enemies, including the United States and various European nations. 
Encrypted messaging services such as Telegram can make it difficult for law enforcement and 
counter-terrorism agencies to identify these individuals who are in the process of being 
recruited.20 Other messaging services commonly used by recruiters include KIK and WhatsApp. 
Al-Hayat Media Center, Dabiq magazine, and various websites such as Revolution 
Muslim are crucial tools to ISIS’ ability to spread its ideology. It also has a mobile app called the 
Dawn of Glad Tidings to keep users up to date and computer games that contain images 
attractive to young people.21 High-quality films such as Flames of War and videos posted on 
YouTube serve as compelling propaganda for the group. These include violent videos of 
beheadings and executions, which have multiple functions. They appeal to those seeking 
excitement and adventure, display the group’s strength, portray ISIS as an “agent of positive 
change and champion of social justice”, as well as inspire fear among their enemies.22 These 
videos normalize brutality, lessening people’s possible moral objections to the group’s actions, 
as well as glamorize extremism and jihadism and project an image of itself that is very different 
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from the reality. ISIS also creates videos that are community-oriented. These include videos of 
ISIS fighters “eating candy and playing with kittens” to assure potential recruits that the group 
“promot[es] the welfare of people” and to demonstrate a “lifestyle of happiness, structure, and 
support.”23 This makes the group especially appealing to impressionable people, namely youth; 
by making it and its aims appear utopian, ISIS attracts people looking for adventure, a 
community, a purpose. 
 Propaganda, spread primarily online, can be used to gain sympathy and recruit members. 
Use of the internet and social media enables ISIS to reach individuals thousands of miles away 
and is an effective method to contact and influence a large number of individuals.  
Explanation 3: Kinship Recruitment 
 Finally, a third common explanation for how ISIS gains members is kinship recruitment, 
of which there are two main types. In the first type of kinship recruitment, individuals may be 
radicalized and recruited by a family member or close friend who is already a member of ISIS. A 
second type of kinship recruitment involves close friends or family members being recruited at 
the same time by an ISIS recruiter. People feel more comfortable becoming a member of a group 
if they are joined by someone with whom they have a close relationship. The “strong bonds of 
friendship and kinship” can lead people to follow their friends and family into radicalism.24 
Siblings often radicalize each other and assure each other that any violent actions they undertake 
are not morally reprehensible and wrong but rather meaningful and justifiable. They feel a strong 
sense of trust, and feel more secure in their choice to join a radical group such as ISIS. In 
addition, family members or friends sent on missions together can help each other put aside last-
minute doubts and convince each other to carry out their assignment. Having family members as 
part of the group also poses a challenge for law enforcement, as it easy for individuals living 
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together to communicate without being detected by surveillance, and the strong bonds among 
family members lessen the chance of betrayal to authorities.25 
 The recruitment of family members and friends is a tool that has been used by many 
extremist groups, as it offers terrorist groups a variety of benefits.  
 
Operationalization 
 Each of these explanations seek to describe how ISIS recruits. To determine if they do 
this, 12 individuals were analyzed to see whether these strategies played a role in their 
recruitment process. Questions were developed that more narrowly define each explanation, 
making them more measurable and concrete in order to better understand if they apply to the 
individuals studied. If the explanation applies to two-thirds or more of the cases, it is considered 
a strong, valid explanation of ISIS’ recruitment methods. If the explanation applies to between 
one-third and two-thirds of cases, it can be considered a moderately strong explanation. Finally, 
if the explanation applies to fewer than a third of the cases studied, it is a weak explanation of 
ISIS’ recruitment process.  
Explanation 1: Strategic Targeting 
 The Islamic State strategically targets vulnerable individuals. Vulnerabilities can be 
divided into several categories: 
1. Was the individual 25 or younger at his or her time of radicalization?  
a. The age 25 was chosen as this is a commonly-accepted age in the United States as 
a cognitive landmark. It is the age at which the prefrontal cortex, or the “rational 
brain,” which plays a role in planning, decision-making and judgement, develops.  
2. Did the individual lack a sense of purpose or direction in life?  
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a. This was determined by individuals self-reported feelings as well as the reports of 
individuals who knew them well and interacted with them often, including family 
members, friends, schoolmates, teachers, and employers.  
3. Did the individual experience discrimination based on their religion or ethnic 
background? 
a. Muslims and individuals of Middle Eastern descent are likely to have experienced 
discrimination if they live in Western nations. If the individuals or people living 
in and around their community reported prevalent discrimination, then the answer 
to this question is “yes”. 
4. Did the individual feel isolated or alienated from society? 
a. An individual who had few friends in school or work, or individuals who 
described themselves or were described as spending a great amount of time alone 
by those close to them, constitutes a “yes” to this question. 
5. Did the individual grow up in difficult circumstances? 
a. Such circumstances include a turbulent home situation when growing up (a lack 
of coherent rules, a non-supportive or warm environment, abuse), living in 
poverty or homelessness, having limited work or education opportunities, and 
other similar conditions.  
6. Was the individual a recent convert to Islam, or strongly religious with conservative 
views? 
a. A recent convert is defined as an individual who converted to Islam within a year 
of his or her radicalization and recruitment.  
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b. An individual can be considered strongly religious if he or she regularly attended 
a mosque, were knowledgeable of the Quran, and spent a great amount of time 
reading about or discussing Islam. Conservative views are defined as those that 
profess a more traditional, strict, literal interpretation of Islam. These include but 
are not limited to Salafism and Wahhabism.  
To measure this method an additive scale was created. An answer of “yes” on each 
question receives a score of 1, and “no” of 0. Each category signifies a significant vulnerability, 
therefore, if an individual received a score of 1 or higher the explanation of strategic targeting 
applies to him or her. The more of these categories apply to the individual, the higher the score, 
and the more vulnerable the person was to radicalization and recruitment. Possible scores range 
from 0, meaning the individual was not at all vulnerable to recruitment by ISIS, to 6, meaning 
the individual is highly susceptible to radicalization and recruitment. 
Explanation 2: Online Recruitment 
 To determine whether individuals were recruited online, several questions were asked 
about each person: 
1. Was the individual active on social media sites commonly used by ISIS, such as Twitter, 
Facebook, Instagram, and Tumblr?  
a. “Active” is defined as having accounts on one or more of these social media sites 
that the individual used at least weekly at the time of his or her radicalization, or 
as determined by the individual him or herself.  
b.  “Yes” suggests that there was an opportunity for the individual to have been 
radicalized online. 
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2. Did the individual access radical ISIS propaganda through various platforms, including 
YouTube, Dabiq magazine, Flames of War, and websites such as Revolution Muslim? 
a. “Yes” suggests that there was an opportunity for the individual to have been 
radicalized online. 
3. Did the individual have contact with radical Islamists online? 
a. “Yes” suggests that the individual was recruited online. 
4. Was the individual contacted by or put in contact with a member of ISIS through the 
internet? Did they exchange online messages with a recruiter? 
a. “Yes” suggests that the individual was recruited online. 
An answer of “yes” to two or more of these questions suggests that an individual was 
likely to have been radicalized and recruited online. A score of 2 is required as merely being 
active on social media, accessing propaganda, or having contact with radical individuals through 
the internet does not mean an individual was recruited online. However, when two or more of 
these questions apply to an individual, this signifies that he or she was often online and it is 
likely that the internet did play a role in their radicalization and that they were recruited online.  
Explanation 3: Kinship Recruitment 
 Kinship recruitment is measured with two questions: 
1. Did the individual have contact with a close family member or friend who was already a 
member of ISIS? 
2. Was the individual recruited with, or at the same time as, a close family member or 
friend? 
If the answer to either one of these questions is “yes”, then kinship recruitment played a role 
in the radicalization of the individual, as both questions involve kinship connections. 
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Challenges 
 In this study, I have created standards for testing whether the aforementioned methods 
explain ISIS’ recruitment. In measuring the first method, strategic targeting, there is ambiguity in 
several of the questions used to determine whether someone was vulnerable to radicalization and 
recruitment, which leaves room for varying interpretations. Although this issue cannot be 
completely mitigated, the questions were defined as definitively as possible in attempt to limit 
this ambiguity. In addition, the inability to obtain information directly from the individuals 
examined in this paper opens the study to the possibility of inaccurate and/or incomplete 
information. In an attempt to mitigate this issue, information was gathered from multiple sources 
when possible; sources that gathered information from either the individuals or those who had 
known them were preferred. However, for some of the individuals, information to answer some 
of the questions was still lacking. Individuals were not given a score of 0 or 1 on these questions, 
but were instead denoted as “unknown.” When adding the scores for each explanation for the 
cases, “unknown” was treated as 0. This affects the total score of the specific explanation for a 
particular individual: the score may be lower than if information was available, which impacts 
the overall results of the study.  
 In addition, there is a lack of consistency in the scales used in the operationalization of 
each method. In the first, an additive scale is used to determine how vulnerable an individual is. 
Ideally the same scale would be used for each of the three methods, however, the second and 
third methods do not lend themselves to an additive scale. This is a limitation of this study that 
could be addressed in future projects to push the study further. 
 Finally, there are limitations inherent in a case-study analysis. There is the question of 
how generalizable the results are to ISIS recruits at large. It is impossible to interview each 
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member of ISIS and understand what drove them to join the group and how they were recruited. 
Information like this was publicly available for only a small number of individuals. Though this 
limits how much the results can be generalized to the broader population, ultimately a case-study 
analysis still provides important insight into the radicalization and recruitment process of the 
Islamic State. In addition, this research sets the stage for future studies that have the resources to 
gather more information and analyze larger samples.  
 
Case Studies 
This section looks at nine cases, six individuals and three pairs of siblings, in order to test 
the validity of each of the three explanations detailed above: strategic targeting, online 
connections, and kinship. I take a biographical approach in each case study, describing the 
individual’s background and then examining them in relation to each explanation to ascertain if 
one, two, all, or none of the explanations apply to the individual. I gathered information mainly 
from news articles to answer questions about the applicability of each explanation. 
Case 1: Ayu 
Ayu is a 34-year-old Indonesian woman who is now the head of a pro-Islamic State 
network in Hong Kong.ii Her duties include spreading propaganda for the group, recruiting new 
members, and raising funds. Ayu gave an interview to Nava Nuraniyah, a researcher with the 
Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict based in Jakarta, Indonesia, for a New York Times article 
about the radicalization of Indonesian domestic workers living abroad.  
                                                 
ii The name Ayu is a pseudonym, as the woman feared the consequences of using her real name 
in an article published in The New York Times. 
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Ayu had a difficult life growing up. She became pregnant before the age of 20, and after 
giving birth left her baby behind and ran away from her abusive in-laws, fleeing from Indonesia 
to Hong Kong. She had depression, became addicted to alcohol and drugs, and lived on the 
streets for months after losing her job as a maid three separate times. She described herself as 
Muslim only in name until that point, but told Nuraniyah that as her life fell apart, she began 
seeking spiritual refuge. By this time, she was in her late twenties. It was 2011, the year that the 
war in Syria began. Ayu began devotedly checking the news for updates in Syria and accessing 
Islamic websites such as voa-islam.com and kibalt.net. She enrolled in an Islamic course, but 
dropped out after the teacher reported her to the police for holding radical views and supporting 
the Islamic State, which she did by spreading propaganda on Twitter and Telegram. Through 
social media she became friends with various international jihadists, and eventually met her 
husband, a jihadi, through Facebook. Her marriage brought her closer to pro-ISIS networks in 
Hong Kong and facilitated her rise to her current position.26  
Method 1: Strategic Targeting 
Although Ayu was older than 25 at the time of her radicalization, she experienced 
difficult circumstances, such as an abusive family, pregnancy, and living on the streets, in her 
youth that made her vulnerable to radicalization. She could not keep a steady job, and felt that 
her life lacked meaning. In addition, she was a recent convert to Islam, and went through a rapid 
religious transformation that contributed to her radicalization. She did not experience high levels 
of discrimination in Indonesia as it was her home nation and Islam is the dominant religion there. 
Though Islam is less commonly practiced in Hong Kong, Ayu did not mention in her interview 
feelings of discrimination or alienation from society, though it is possible that she experienced 
both of these things, particularly when living on the streets in Hong Kong.27  
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Method 2: Online Recruitment 
Though Ayu did not explicitly state how often she used social media sites, through her 
interview it is clear that she was active on social media including Facebook and Twitter, and that 
she was in contact with radical individuals through these sites. In addition, she mentioned that 
she accessed websites such as voa-islam.com and kibalt.net and actively spread ISIS propaganda. 
There is no mention of whether she was in direct contact with an ISIS recruiter through the 
internet.28 
Method 3: Kinship Recruitment 
Ayu met and eventually married a jihadi who had ties with ISIS. This marriage brought 
her further into pro-ISIS networks and facilitated her rise to her position as a head of a network 
that raises money and spreads propaganda for the Islamic State.29 
 
Table 1: Factors that influenced Ayu’s radicalization and recruitment 
Method Indicators Case 1: Ayu 
Strategic Targeting 
Youth No 
Lack of a Sense of Purpose Yes 
Discrimination Unknown 
Isolation or Alienation Unknown 
Difficult Circumstances Yes 
Recent Convert or Strongly and Conservatively Religious Yes 
Score 3 
Online Recruitment 
Social Media Yes 
Radical Propaganda Yes 
Contact with Radicals Online Yes 
Contact with Recruiter Online Unknown 
Score 3 
Kinship Recruitment 
Contact with family/friends already a member Yes 
At same time as friend/family member No 
Score 1 
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Strategic Targeting 
A score of 3 means that Ayu was relatively vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment 
by ISIS. 
Online Recruitment 
Three yes’s on this measure means that Ayu was most likely radicalized and recruited 
online. 
Kinship Recruitment 
One yes means that kinship recruitment played a role in Ayu’s radicalization. 
 
 
Case 2: Firda 
 Nuraniyah also interviewed Firda (again a pseudonym), an Indonesian maid living abroad 
in Singapore. Firda told Nuraniyah that though she had a decent job and a nice boss, she felt 
“empty” and “spiritually dry”. She began listening to Salafi podcasts while working, and 
searched Facebook for people who seemed “very Islamic”, desperate for friends who could guide 
her intensely. Similar to Ayu, Firda met her boyfriend online, and this man further radicalized 
her by introducing her to pro-ISIS websites including millahibrahim.wordpress.com.30 
Method 1: Strategic Targeting 
 A large amount of information for this measure was not publicly available for Firda. Her 
age was not mentioned in the New York Times, and as “Firda” is a pseudonym, other sources 
could not be found to determine this information. Though she mentions having a nice job and 
decent money, other details of her life, such as her living situation or the circumstances of her 
youth were not related, thus a definitive answer for multiple questions was unable to be formed. 
Method 2: Online Recruitment 
In her interview, Firda admitted that she was “online 24 hours every day.” Her time 
online was spent searching Facebook and listening to Salafi podcasts accessed through the 
internet. After meeting her boyfriend online, she began to access websites that espoused ISIS 
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propaganda. It is unknown if she was directly contacted by a recruiter or if her online contact 
was only through radical individuals. 
Method 3: Kinship Recruitment 
A jihadi, Firda’s boyfriend introduced her to pro-ISIS websites which advanced her 
radicalization.31 
 
Table 2: Factors that influenced Firda’s radicalization and recruitment 
Method Indicators Case 2: Firda 
Strategic Targeting 
Youth Unknown 
Lack of a Sense of Purpose Yes 
Discrimination Unknown 
Isolation or Alienation Unknown 
Difficult Circumstances Unknown 
Recent Convert or Strongly and Conservatively Religious Yes 
Score 2 
Online Recruitment 
Social Media Yes 
Radical Propaganda Yes 
Contact with Radicals Online Yes 
Contact with Recruiter Online Unknown 
Score 3 
Kinship Recruitment 
Contact with family/friends already a member Yes 
At same time as friend/family member No 
Score 1 
Strategic Targeting  
A score of 2 means that Firda was at least slightly vulnerable to radicalization and 
recruitment by ISIS. It is possible that she was quite vulnerable, though with information on four 
of these categories unknown, this is difficult to determine.  
Online Recruitment 
Three yes’s on this measure means that Firda was likely radicalized and recruited online. 
Kinship Recruitment 
One yes means that kinship recruitment played a role in Firda’s radicalization. 
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Case 3: Yoki Pratama Windyarto 
 Yoki Pratama Windyarto was born in Indonesia in the small town of Purworejo Klampok, 
a community described as “tolerant.”32 By the time he was 21 he had joined the Islamic State and 
travelled to the Philippines, where ISIS is conducting its most intense campaign outside of Syria 
and Iraq. He was martyred only weeks after he disappeared from his home. His family still does 
not fully understand why he joined the Islamic State, and several of his relatives gave interviews 
to the New York Times.  
Yoki grew up in a primarily Muslim neighborhood, and was described by relatives and 
others who knew him as being very devout, even when young. He held conservative religious 
views and expressed these to several family members; this included a belief that a woman’s 
place is in the home. However, relatives stated that they were not aware of how radical his views 
were. Though his family lived comfortably by local standards and his parents had decent jobs, 
they still could not afford to send Yoki to the university he had been accepted into. Instead, they 
sent him to the Indonesia Aviation School, a strict boarding school in Tangerang, where students 
were not allowed to leave or to communicate over phone with anyone for three months. He was 
described as “despondent” during his time there.33 
Method 1: Strategic Targeting 
 Yoki was 21 when he joined ISIS, a prime age for terrorist recruiters. In addition, he was 
frustrated that he had to attend aviation school, which he viewed as limiting his opportunities for 
later in life. It is not known whether he felt alienated from society, but it is possible that he felt 
isolated during his time at the aviation school. Though his family lived comfortably, he was still 
unable to attend university, which could classify as a “yes” under the difficult circumstances 
indicator. Yoki was strongly religious with conservative views, which also made him a target for 
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recruiters. Finally, it is unlikely that Yoki experienced ethnic or religious discrimination, as he 
was from Indonesia, a country in which Islam is the dominant religion.34 
Method 2: Online Recruitment 
 There is no information publicly available on whether Yoki used social media or was 
exposed to radical propaganda, nor is there information on the extent to which he had contact 
with recruiters online, though Sidney Jones, the Director of the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy 
Analysis of Conflict and a leading expert on terrorism in Southeast Asia, believes he was likely 
recruited in person.35 
Method 3: Kinship Recruitment 
Details of how Yoki was recruited to join ISIS are not available, but interviews with 
family members suggest he was not recruited through kinship connections. Over a dozen 
relatives said he had never spoken to them about the Islamic State and had not known he 
embraced the group’s radical ideology. None of Yoki’s family is known to be in ISIS or to hold 
radical views.  
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Table 3: Factors that influenced Yoki Windyarto’s radicalization and recruitment 
Method Indicators Case 3: Yoki 
Strategic Targeting 
Youth Yes 
Lack of a Sense of Purpose Yes 
Discrimination 
Unknown, but 
unlikely 
Isolation or Alienation Unknown 
Difficult Circumstances Yes 
Recent Convert or Strongly and Conservatively Religious Yes 
Score 4 
Online Recruitment 
Social Media Unknown 
Radical Propaganda Unknown 
Contact with Radicals Online Unknown 
Contact with Recruiter Online Unknown 
Score                        0 
Kinship Recruitment 
Contact with family/friends already a member Unknown 
At same time as friend/family member No 
Score 
                             
0 
Strategic Targeting 
A score of 4 means that Yoki was highly vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by 
ISIS. 
Online Recruitment 
There is very little information on the process of Yoki’s recruitment, whether it was 
online or in person, so Yoki received a score of 0 on this explanation.  
Kinship Recruitment 
 A score of 0 means that Yoki was probably not recruited through kinship relationships, 
though with some information unknown it is possible.   
 
 
Case Study 4: Akhror Saidakhmetov 
 Around the age of 19, Akhror Saidakhmetov was arrested for providing material support 
to the Islamic State. Akhror described his radicalization in a 53-page memo given to the New 
York Times.  
Akhror had a difficult life growing up. He was born in Kazakhstan, and at the age of four 
his mother took him and fled his abusive, alcoholic father to her hometown in the northern part 
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of the country. Months later they moved again, this time to Tashkent, Uzbekistan. To support her 
and her son, his mother, Saeira Gulyamova, worked long hours as a journalist, leaving Akhror 
alone in their apartment until around 9:00pm most nights. Saeira’s journalism eventually put her 
at odds with the Uzebek government, and she moved to Brooklyn, New York, where she found 
work cleaning houses. A year later, Akhror, now 16, joined his mother. He again spent much of 
his time alone, as his mother was often working. He spoke only a small amount of English and 
despite attempts to get involved in his high school by joining the swim and martial arts teams, he 
had few friends. After being expelled from one high school, he dropped out of another and 
became depressed. He began spending more and more time on the internet, watching religious 
videos and listening to the lectures of Sheik Abdullah Bukhari, eventually gaining more radical 
views and “embracing the Islamic State.”36 
Akhkor Saidakhmetov had been Muslim only in name until this point, but his newfound 
devotion to religion gave him “direction” and “purpose.” However, it also led him to fights with 
his mother. After a particularly severe fight, she moved away from their home, again leaving 
Akhror, now 18, alone. Yet again he was abandoned, this time “at the worst time possible.” 
Abdurasul Jurabov, a friend from the mosque he attended, who was 24 and even more devout 
than Akhror, moved in not long after Akhror’s mother left. Jurabov influenced Akhror to more 
extreme views, as did major events that were occurring in the Middle East around this time. 
When the leader of the Islamic State Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the formation of a 
caliphate in 2014, Akhror felt a “‘sense of belonging’”, that he was “‘a part of a worldwide 
online community […] supporting a religious movement.” This led him and Jurabov to post pro-
ISIS comments on a jihadist website called Hilofatnews, praising, for example, a mass execution 
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by ISIS. He and Jurabov bought plane tickets to Istanbul, planning to enter Syria from Turkey to 
join the Islamic State, but were arrested before they were able to leave the country.37 
Method 1: Strategic Targeting 
 Akhror Saidakhmetov classifies as vulnerable to recruitment in multiple categories. He 
grew up in difficult circumstances, with an abusive father whom he fled when young, which led 
him to spend much of his childhood and youth alone while his mother worked. He spoke little 
English and had few friends when he moved to America. Though the New York Times does not 
explicitly mention experiences of discrimination due to his ethnicity or religion, it is likely that 
he faced prejudice living in the United States as a Kazakh, Muslim immigrant who spoke little 
English, and he certainly felt alienated from society. In his memo, he describes himself as 
finding Islam at a “time of ‘disconnection, loss, and lack of purpose.’” Islam and the Islamic 
State offered him a way out of his depression and loneliness, providing him with a sense of 
direction and belonging. He was also at an impressionable age at this time, not even 20 years old 
when his radicalization began.38  
Method 2: Online Recruitment 
 Though The New York Times article on Akhror did not mention the specific social media 
sites or websites that he accessed, his memo does state that it was through the internet that he 
found his religiosity and gained more conservative views. After Abdurasul Jurabov moved in 
with him, he began accessing clearly pro-ISIS sites, such as Hilofatnews. It is unclear if he was 
in contact with a recruiter online. From the testimony of FBI agent Ryan Singer in the case of 
United States of America vs. Abdurasul Hasanovich Jurabov, Akhror Saidakhmetov, and Abror 
Habibov, it appears that Jurabov contacted ISIS representatives multiple times on behalf of 
himself and Akhror.39 
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Method 3: Kinship Recruitment 
 Akhror’s roommate Abdurasul Jurabov, who was the only person close to Akhror after 
his mother left, played a crucial role in his radicalization. Jurabov was extremely devout and 
well-versed in Islamic law, and he “quickly cast a spell on [Akhror]”, who referred to him as 
“sheikh”. It was when he lived with Jurabov that Akhror started paying more attention to the 
Islamic State and began planning his journey to join the organization.40 
 
Table 4: Factors that influenced Akhror Saidakhmetov’s radicalization and recruitment 
Method Indicators Case 4: Akhror 
Strategic Targeting 
Youth Yes 
Lack of a Sense of Purpose Yes 
Discrimination 
Unknown but 
likely 
Isolation or Alienation Yes 
Difficult Circumstances Yes 
Recent Convert or Strongly and Conservatively Religious Yes 
Score 5 
Online Recruitment 
Social Media Unknown 
Radical Propaganda Yes 
Contact with Radicals Online Unknown 
Contact with Recruiter Online Unknown 
Score 1 
Kinship Recruitment 
Contact with family/friends already a member Unknown 
At same time as friend/family member Yes 
Score 1 
Strategic Targeting  
A score of 5 means that Akhror was highly vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment 
by ISIS.  
Online Recruitment 
One definitive yes on this measure is not enough to determine whether Akrhor was 
recruited online, however it is known that he was at least influenced by ISIS propaganda 
accessed through the internet.   
Kinship Recruitment 
One yes means that kinship recruitment played a role in Akrhor’s radicalization. 
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Case Study 5: Aqsa Mahmood 
 Aqsa Mahmood, a propagandist and recruiter for the Islamic State, uses social media 
such as Twitter and Tumblr to promote life in ISIS, persuade British Muslims to join the 
organization, and offer advice on how to do so, as well as to call for terror attacks against the 
West. She is also suspected of having a leadership role in the female al-Khannassaa Brigade in 
Raqqa, Syria. Her blog details how she came to join the Islamic State and what life in Syria is 
like as a young woman in ISIS.41 
Aqsa is from a Pakistani immigrant family, but lived a privileged life in Glasglow, 
Scotland. She lived in an affluent neighborhood and attended elite private schools. She was 
intelligent, popular, and was studying at Glasglow Caledonian University. She had a stable home 
life and was raised as a moderate Muslim in an apolitical family. Despite this promising life 
however, in 2013, at the age of 19, Aqsa dropped out of university and disappeared to Syria.  
A variety of factors influenced Aqsa Mahmood’s radicalization. In her blog, she 
expressed that her motivations for joining ISIS were personal: she felt estranged from her family, 
dissatisfied with her life, and admired those fighting in the resistance. Though she grew up 
secular, she became more religious after the civil war in Syria began. Her blog also reveals a 
profound loss around this time that left her “vulnerable to seeking redemption through religious 
indoctrination: ‘Even though last year was my most depressed year ever I’m so happy everything 
that happened to me, happened. Because if it didn’t, I wouldn’t have realized how amazing my 
life is with Allah in it.’” ISIS provided a sense of meaning to Aqsa after this loss. In addition, she 
had romanticized and uninformed expectations of what life in Syria under ISIS was like, which 
were fueled by the promise of marriage from Adeel Ulhaq, whom she met online.42  
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Method 1: Strategic Targeting 
 Aqsa Mahmood’s radicalization is “unusual” in that on the surface she does not fit the 
typical stereotype of an ISIS recruit. Her family was not poor, her education and employment 
opportunities were not limited, she did not experience discrimination and she had plenty of 
friends. However, below the surface, her life was not what she wanted. She felt some loss that 
played a major role in her radicalization. She was not satisfied with her life; it seemed to lack 
meaning, purpose. When Aqsa learned about events occurring in the Middle East, such as the 
Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War, she was inspired to learn more about Islam and ISIS, and 
her rapid conversion to Islam left her vulnerable to manipulative messages from the group. In 
addition, her youth may have affected her reasoning, made her impulsive, and left her 
impressionable to promises of marriage and power.43 
Method 2: Online Recruitment 
 Aqsa’s parents maintain that their daughter was radicalized online by Adeel Ulhaq, and it 
is clear that she spent much of her time online, writing her blog, perusing religious texts, and 
following news of events in the Middle East.44 
Method 3: Kinship Recruitment 
 Aqsa’s family did not play a role in her radicalization or recruitment, as they were 
moderate and apolitical and have since condemned her decision to join the Islamic State, 
releasing a statement pleading with youth not to join the group. They call Aqsa’s words “‘twisted 
and evil’ and said she is no longer the daughter they raised.” Adeel Ulhaq, a man she met online 
who promised her marriage, did play a role in her radicalization, however, she left for Syria 
before they were married, and she is now married to a different jihadi whom she met in Syria.45 
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Table 5: Factors that influenced Aqsa Mahmood’s radicalization and recruitment 
Method Indicators Case 5: Aqsa 
Strategic Targeting 
Youth Yes 
Lack of a Sense of Purpose Yes 
Discrimination No 
Isolation or Alienation No 
Difficult Circumstances No 
Recent Convert or Strongly and Conservatively Religious Yes 
Score 3 
Online Recruitment 
Social Media Yes 
Radical Propaganda Unknown 
Contact with Radicals Online Yes 
Contact with Recruiter Online Unknown 
Score 2 
Kinship Recruitment 
Contact with family/friends already a member Yes 
At same time as friend/family member No 
Score 1 
Strategic Targeting  
A score of 3 means that Aqsa was relatively vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment 
by ISIS.  
Online Recruitment 
Two yes’s on this measure means that Aqsa was likely radicalized and recruited online. 
Kinship Recruitment 
One yes signifies that kinship recruitment played a role in Aqsa’s radicalization. 
 
Case Study 6: Najim Laachraoui 
 On March 22, 2016 at Brussels Airport in Belgium, 24-year-old Najim Laacharaoui killed 
15 people with a suicide bomb as a part of a three-pronged terrorist attack by the Islamic State in 
the city. He is suspected of having built the bombs for both the Brussels attacks and the 2015 
Paris attacks.  
Though Najim was born in Morocco, his family immigrated to Belgium when he was 
young and he grew up in Schaerbeek, Brussels, a neighborhood with a “long history of racism” 
where the unemployment rate for Muslim youths is around 40%. During his youth, he 
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“grappl[ed] with what kind of Muslim he wanted to be”, and by the time he graduated from his 
Catholic high school he had abandoned his moderate views, adopting Salafist dress and “refusing 
to shake hands with women.” The purist, extremist Islam he adhered to disapproved of the West 
and Najim felt like an outsider in his high school. This feeling deepened when he enrolled in the 
Universitie Libre de Bruxelles to study electrical engineering, where he was even more of a 
minority. He left the university after only a year and dropped out of a second university as well. 
The young Najim, lacking a direction in life, feeling alienated from society, and possessing 
extremist views, was vulnerable to recruitment. It was at this time that he met Khalid Zerkani, a 
charismatic street preacher who solidified Najim’s recruitment into ISIS.46 
Method 1: Strategic Targeting 
 Najim was 22 when he disappeared from his family in Belgium, travelling to Syria to join 
the Islamic State. Growing up as both a religious and ethnic minority was difficult for Najim, and 
he felt isolated from the surrounding community. Racism and Islamophobia in Belgium 
decreased the work opportunities available to him, and though his good grades in high school 
enabled him to attend university, he dropped out twice, struggling to discover his purpose in life 
and reconcile his conservative views with the Western society in which he lived. He was not a 
recent convert to Islam, but he did have conservative views that, combined with other factors, 
left him vulnerable to radicalization.47 
Method 2: Online Recruitment 
 Najim radicalized invisibly, not in prison, but in school. His in-person contact with the 
preacher Khalid Zerkani is what drew him to the Islamic State. Information on his use of social 
media or exposure to radical websites is not currently publicly available.  
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Method 3: Kinship Recruitment 
 Kinship did not play a large role in Najim’s recruitment. None of his family members 
share his extremist views or are members of the Islamic State.  
 
Table 6: Factors that influenced Najim Laarouchi’s radicalization and recruitment 
Method Indicators Case 6: Najim 
Strategic Targeting 
Youth Yes 
Lack of a Sense of Purpose Yes 
Discrimination Yes 
Isolation or Alienation Yes 
Difficult Circumstances Yes 
Recent Convert or Strongly and Conservatively Religious Yes 
Score 6 
Online Recruitment 
Social Media Unknown 
Radical Propaganda Unknown 
Contact with Radicals Online Unknown 
Contact with Recruiter Online 
Unknown, but 
unlikely 
Score 0 
Kinship Recruitment 
Contact with family/friends already a member No 
At same time as friend/family member No 
Score 0 
Strategic Targeting  
A score of 6 means that Najim was extremely vulnerable to radicalization and 
recruitment by ISIS.  
Online Recruitment 
A score of 0 means that Najim was not radicalized and recruited online, though with 
information on each indicator lacking, it is possible that propaganda on the internet was a factor 
in his radicalization.  
Kinship Recruitment 
A score of 0 means that kinship recruitment did not play a role in Najim’s radicalization. 
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Case Study 7: Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui 
 Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui were brothers involved in the same Brussels attacks that 
Najim Laarouchi participated in. The two brothers were of Moroccan descent but were born in 
Brussels and lived in Belgium throughout their lives. They grew up in a working-class 
neighborhood with their father, a devout Muslim who emigrated from Morocco, and their 
mother, who is “conservative and reclusive.”  Both had long violent criminal records and were 
imprisoned multiple times, including for armed robbery, carjacking, and possession of 
weapons.48 They were likely radicalized by their cousin Oussama Atar, the mastermind of the 
Brussels attacks who visited them 20 times while they were in prison.49 Both were released on 
parole in 2014. Ibrahim then attempted to travel to Syria to join the Islamic State, but was 
stopped at the Turkish-Syrian border and deported to the Netherlands. Turkish authorities claim 
they warned Belgian and Dutch officials that he was “a foreign terrorist fighter.” At the time of 
the attacks, Ibrahim was 29 and Khalid was 27.50 
Method 1: Strategic Targeting 
Though both Ibrahim and Khalid were older than 25 when they committed the suicide 
bombings in Brussels, they may have been radicalized while younger. They were believed to 
have been radicalized in prison; for Khalid, this would have been when he was 25 and younger. 
Little is known about the two men, making it difficult to determine whether they lacked a sense 
of direction, whether they felt alienated from society, and whether they faced discrimination or 
difficult circumstances growing up. Their parents were devout and conservative; growing up in 
this environment may have led them to be both as well. 
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Method 2: Online Recruitment 
 The internet does not appear to have played much of a role in the Bakraoui brothers’ 
recruitment. They were likely recruited in person by their cousin. Information on whether they 
used social media or accessed radical websites is not currently available.  
Method 3: Kinship Recruitment 
 Kinship recruitment played a major role in the Bakraoui brothers’ recruitment. They 
joined ISIS together, and it is suspected that they were recruited by their cousin during his visits 
to them while they were in prison.  
 
Table 7: Factors that influenced Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakrauoi’s radicalization and recruitment 
Method Indicators 
Case 7a: 
Ibrahim 
Case 7b: 
Khalid 
Strategic 
Targeting 
Youth No Yes 
Lack of a Sense of Purpose Unknown Unknown 
Discrimination Unknown Unknown 
Isolation or Alienation Unknown Unknown 
Difficult Circumstances Unknown Unknown 
Recent Convert or Strongly and 
Conservatively Religious Unknown Unknown 
Score 0 1 
Online 
Recruitment 
Social Media Unknown Unknown 
Radical Propaganda Unknown Unknown 
Contact with Radicals Online Unknown Unknown 
Contact with Recruiter Online No No 
Score 0 0 
Kinship 
Recruitment 
Contact with family/friends already a 
member Yes Yes 
At same time as friend/family member Yes Yes 
Score 2 2 
Strategic Targeting  
A score of 0 suggests that Ibrahim was not at all vulnerable to radicalization, while a 
score of 1 suggests that Khalid was only slightly susceptible to radicalization and recruitment by 
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ISIS. However, as the information for most of these indicators is unknown, more information 
about the brothers could show that they were much more susceptible to recruitment.  
Online Recruitment 
Scores of 0 signify that neither brother was radicalized and recruited online. More 
information on several indicators is needed to concretely determine if this was the case or if 
the internet did in fact play a role in their radicalization.  
Kinship Recruitment 
A score of 2 means that kinship ties played a significant role in the radicalization and 
recruitment of both Ibrahim and Khalid. 
 
Case Study 8: Brahim and Salah Abdeslam 
 In 2015, the Islamic State orchestrated attacks on Paris that killed 130 people and injured 
many more. Brahim, 31 at the time, and Salah Abdeslam, 26, were two brothers involved in 
these attacks. The two brothers were of Moroccan descent and were French nationals, but were 
born in Brussels and grew up in Molenbeek, a district in Brussels from which multiple jihadists 
have emerged.51 Brahim and Salah were friends with Abdelhamid Abaaoud, an Islamic State 
operative and the organizer of the Paris attacks, in childhood and he guided the two brothers’ 
recruitment into ISIS.52 Unlike Abaaoud, neither Salah nor Brahim had histories of religious 
extremism. They lived secular lifestyles, spending much of their time drinking, smoking, playing 
cards, and flirting with girls. Opportunities for work were limited.  
Salah was a mechanic, but was a poor employee and was eventually fired. A few years 
later he began helping Brahim manage a bar in Molenbeek but it was not a great success, and 
they sold it just weeks before the attacks. Both Salah and Brahim also had criminal records for 
minor crimes during their youth and in the years leading up to the Paris attacks, and Salah spent 
some time in prison with Abdelhamid Abaaoud. Abaaoud, who had travelled to Syria in 2014 
where he made ties with ISIS, influenced Salah to become more radical when he returned, and 
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Salah in turn influenced Brahim. Salah’s ex-fiancé confirmed that he was radicalized by 
Abaaoud after he returned from Syria. 53  
Method 1: Strategic Targeting 
 Salah was 25 around the time that Abaaoud returned from Syria, which is when he was 
radicalized. Brahim, however, was older. They lived secular lives until just months before the 
attacks, suggesting that they were both recent converts to Islam. They lived in difficult 
circumstances; Salah was fired and unemployed for several years until he began helping his 
brother manage a bar and several other businesses, but these were not particularly successful, and 
they were both involved in crime. It is unclear whether they lacked a sense of purpose or whether 
they felt discriminated against or alienated from society.  
Method 2: Online Recruitment 
 Salah and Brahim were likely not radicalized online. Information on their internet use 
was not accessible, but it is likely that they were recruited in-person by their friend Abdelhamid 
Abaaoud and not by a recruiter online.  
Method 3: Kinship Recruitment 
 Salah and Brahim were radicalized together and by Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a life-long 
friend, which classifies as kinship recruitment.  
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Table 8: Factors that influenced Brahim and Salah Abdeslam’s radicalization and recruitment 
Method Indicators 
Case 8a: 
Brahim Case 8b: Salah 
Strategic 
Targeting 
Youth No Yes 
Lack of a Sense of Purpose Unknown Unknown 
Discrimination Unknown Unknown 
Isolation or Alienation Unknown Unknown 
Difficult Circumstances Yes Yes 
Recent Convert or Strongly and 
Conservatively Religious Yes Yes 
Score 2 3 
Online 
Recruitment 
Social Media Unknown Unknown 
Radical Propaganda Unknown Unknown 
Contact with Radicals Online Unknown Unknown 
Contact with Recruiter Online No No 
Score 0 0 
Kinship 
Recruitment 
Contact with family/friends already a 
member Yes Yes 
At same time as friend/family member Yes Yes 
Score 2 2 
Strategic Targeting  
A score of 2 suggests that Brahim was only slightly susceptible to radicalization, while a 
score of 3 suggests that Khalid was fairly susceptible to radicalization and recruitment by ISIS. 
However, as the information for several of these indicators is unknown, more information about 
the brothers could show that they were much more susceptible to recruitment.  
Online Recruitment 
Scores of 0 indicate that neither Brahim nor Salah was radicalized and recruited online, 
though with information on several indicators lacking, it is possible that the internet could have 
played a role in their radicalization.  
Kinship Recruitment 
A score of 2 means that kinship ties played a significant role in the radicalization and 
recruitment of both Brahim and Salah Abdeslam.  
 
 
Case Study 9: Zahra and Salma Halane 
 Zahra and Salma Halane, the “terror twins” as they have been called by several news 
sources, are British Somalian twins who ran off to become jihadi brides and join ISIS in 2014 at 
the age of 16. They are now recruiters for the group.  
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 Zahra and Salma Halane’s parents fled Somalia to Denmark as refugees, and lived there 
for several years. Zahra and Salma were born in Denmark, then the family later moved to 
Manchester, England. The teens were “well integrated members of Western society;” they were 
good students with futures that seemed to be full of opportunity. Nevertheless, the two sisters 
were influenced by radical messages online and may have been encouraged by their older brother 
Ahmed. By the end of 2013 they were viewing ISIS propaganda online, including images of 
British jihadist Abu Qaqa and suicide bombs. Aqsa Mahmood’s Tumblr blog also helped inspire 
their radicalization, and she arranged their marriages to ISIS jihadists whom they met online 
before travelling to Syria. Once in Syria they also tried to recruit their younger brothers and then 
their whole family, claiming that it is a duty to join the Islamic State and “obey the caliph.”54 
Method 1: Strategic Targeting 
 Only 16 at the time they fled to Syria, Zahra and Salma were at a very impressionable 
age, leaving them vulnerable to radicalization. They may have faced discrimination, as women 
who wear traditional Islamic dress are often victims of hate crimes in the United Kingdom. 
However, there is no evidence that they experienced this or alienation from society. Instead those 
who knew them seemed to believe they were well-adapted to Western society. In addition, they 
did not have unstable home lives, and they had good education and bright futures. However, it is 
possible they felt their lives lacked direction, as once they reached the Islamic State they sent 
messages to their family that imply they now feel their lives have purpose and meaning. 
Information on their faith in Islam throughout their childhood and youth could not be found, so it 
is unknown whether they were recent converts or if they had always held strong, conservative 
beliefs.  
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Method 2: Online Recruitment 
Zahra and Salma Halane were inspired by propaganda they saw online, including 
messages from Aqsa Mahmood and images of methods ISIS uses to carry out its attacks. Specific 
websites or social media they accessed or used could not be found. They had contact with radical 
individuals online, including their brother Ahmed, and with ISIS recruiters, including Aqsa 
Mahmood and possibly Abu Qaqa, who has claimed that he lured the girls into the group.  
Method 3: Kinship Recruitment 
 The twins radicalized and joined the Islamic State together, and they also may have been 
influenced by their older brother Ahmed, who held radical views and had left home in 2013, first 
to fight for al-Shabab in Somalia, then moving to Syria to join ISIS55.  
 
Table 9: Factors that influenced Zahra and Salma Halane’s radicalization and recruitment 
Method Indicators 
Case 9a: 
Zahra 
Case 9b: 
Salma 
Strategic 
Targeting 
Youth Yes Yes 
Lack of a Sense of Purpose Unknown Unknown 
Discrimination Unknown Unknown 
Isolation or Alienation No No 
Difficult Circumstances No No 
Recent Convert or Strongly and 
Conservatively Religious Unknown Unknown 
Score 1 1 
Online 
Recruitment 
Social Media 
Unknown, but 
likely 
Unknown, but 
likely 
Radical Propaganda Yes Yes 
Contact with Radicals Online Yes Yes 
Contact with Recruiter Online Yes Yes 
Score 3 3 
Kinship 
Recruitment 
Contact with family/friends already a 
member Yes Yes 
At same time as friend/family member Yes Yes 
Score 2 2 
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Strategic Targeting  
A score of 1 implies that Zahra and Salma Halane were only slightly susceptible to 
radicalization. However, as the information for half of these indicators is lacking, more 
information about the sisters could show that they were more vulnerable to recruitment.  
Online Recruitment 
Scores of 3 indicate that online radicalization played a large role in the recruitment of 
Zahra and Salma. 
Kinship Recruitment 
A score of 2 means that kinship ties played a significant role in the radicalization and 
recruitment of both Zahra and Salma Halane.  
 
Findings 
 This section of the paper synthesizes the results from each of the nine case studies to 
ascertain the validity of the explanations of strategic targeting, online recruitment, and kinship 
recruitment in accounting for how the Islamic State enlists foreign fighters. 
If an individual has a score of 1 or higher on the strategic targeting measure, he or she is 
at least slightly vulnerable to radicalization and this theory of recruitment applies to him or her. 
For an individual to have been recruited online, he or she must have received a score of 2 or 
higher on this measure. Finally, kinship recruitment applies to an individual if his or her score is 
above 0. If an explanation applies to two-thirds of the cases, it can be considered a strong 
explanation of ISIS’ recruitment strategies. If an explanation applies to between one-third and 
two-thirds of cases it is a moderate explanation, and if it applies to fewer than one-third of cases 
the explanation is weak.  
These case studies reveal that both strategic targeting and kinship recruitment are strong 
explanations of ISIS’ recruitment methods, and that online recruitment is a moderately strong 
explanation. This can be seen in Table 10. The explanation of strategic targeting applies to 11 of 
the 12 cases (91.7%). This implies that this is a very strong explanation of ISIS’ recruitment 
methods. Kinship recruitment, which applies to 10 of the 12 individuals studied, or 83.3% of 
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cases studies, is also a strong explanation of ISIS’ recruitment strategies. The explanation of 
online recruitment, however, is only a moderately strong explanation: only 5 of the 12 
individuals satisfied the requirements of this measure. It must be recognized however, that online 
recruitment does apply to 41.7% of the individuals studied, still a large percentage. In addition, 
information was lacking for some of these individuals, which may have kept the scores lower 
than they would have been with complete information. It is therefore possible that with more 
information it would be seen that online recruitment applies to over two-thirds of the cases and 
thus is a strong explanation of ISIS’ recruitment methods.  
These results suggest that the process of recruitment into a terrorist organization such as 
ISIS is influenced by a combination of a variety of factors and differs for each individual, though 
the extremely high percentages for both strategic targeting and kinship recruitment indicate that 
there are common methods that the Islamic State typically uses to gain new members.  
Table 10: Summary of Case Scores 
 
Cases Score Applies? Score Applies? Score Applies?
1:	Ayu 3 Yes 3 Yes 1 Yes
2:	Firda 2 Yes 3 Yes 1 Yes
3:	Yoki 4 Yes 0 No 0 No
4:	Akhror 5 Yes 1 No 1 Yes
5.	Aqsa 3 Yes 2 Yes 1 Yes
6:	Najim 6 Yes 0 No 0 No
7a:	Ibrahim 0 No 0 No 2 Yes
7b:	Khalid 1 Yes 0 No 2 Yes
8a:	Brahim 2 Yes 0 No 2 Yes
8b:	Salah 3 Yes 0 No 2 Yes
9a:	Zahra 1 Yes 3 Yes 2 Yes
9b:	Salma 1 Yes 3 Yes 2 Yes
Score	required	for	a	
strategy	to	apply	
11 5 10
91.7%	of	cases 41.7%	of	cases 83.3%	of	cases
Summary	of	Case	Scores
Strategic	Targeting Online	Recruitment Kinship	Recruitment
Total
1	or	higher 2	or	higher 1	or	higher
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Conclusion 
 In the conclusion, I discuss the current status of the Islamic State, offer implications of 
the results of this study, and propose several policy suggestions for combatting the organization. 
I suggest areas for future research as well. Finally, I provide a brief summary of the study. 
Policy Implications 
 The results of this study indicate that ISIS recruits individuals by exploiting their 
vulnerabilities and kinship connections, as well as suggest that much of this is done online 
through the use of various websites and social media platforms. These methods have enabled 
ISIS to be extremely effective at recruiting individuals from all parts of the world to join the 
group and support its cause. Part of ISIS’ success in recruitment is a result of its remarkable 
ability to gain control of vast amounts of territory in Iraq and Syria despite its size and lack of 
resources compared to the international powers fighting it as a global coalition. ISIS displays this 
strength through propaganda and uses it to persuade individuals that joining the group is the right 
decision. However, recent losses for the Islamic State may negatively affect its ability to recruit. 
In the past year, the Islamic State has lost about 98% of the territory it once held in Iraq and 
Syria, including both Raqqa and Mosul, two key ISIS strongholds. The group’s revenue has also 
been steadily declining.56 This decline has revealed the weaknesses of ISIS, which could 
decrease the number of recruits the organization is able to attract as it is difficult to persuade 
people to join a group that is floundering, especially one that is so risky. People are less willing 
to accept the potential consequences of joining a terrorist group if they do not believe it will 
succeed. Recent losses also impact ISIS’ capabilities as it reduces its wealth and access to 
resources. 
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Though recent losses may impair the Islamic States’ ability to recruit and weaken the 
group as a whole, ISIS remains a threat and it is still necessary to devise ways to ensure its 
defeat. Short-term strategies include continuing military involvement, cutting off fundraising 
capabilities by targeting military strikes on cash storage sites and oil facilities, and restricting 
ISIS’ use of the internet. Twitter has banned hundreds of thousands of accounts but more keep 
arising, and many users switch to Telegram, a more private service that is difficult to regulate. 
YouTube and Facebook remove ISIS uploads, but the group continuously adds new content that 
neither service can keep up with.57 Restricting ISIS’ use of various websites and social media 
accounts can hinder its recruitment efforts, but this is only a short-term solution that should 
supplement other methods that address the root causes of why people join ISIS and provide more 
long-term effects. ISIS recruits by appealing to vulnerable individuals and family members. To 
counter this, the U.S. government and other nations must address the root causes of why people 
join ISIS through education and the implementation of policies and programs that ensure non-
discrimination is practiced in all aspects of society. 
First, education is a crucial strategy to counter the Islamic State’s recruitment as many 
ISIS recruits are around school-age when they join the group. There are a variety of methods to 
provide this education. One is an anti-propaganda campaign. Spreading messages that counter 
ISIS’ claims can reduce its appeal. Discussions of Islam that correct misreadings of the Quran 
delegitimize ISIS’ claims. Imams teaching that killing and brutality are antithetical to true Islam 
could show naïve recent converts that the Islam that ISIS espouses is a manipulation of the 
religion, that it is a type of Islam that the vast majority of Muslims condemn.58 Showing the 
reality of life in ISIS through videos can dispel the myth that ISIS propagates that life with ISIS 
is glamourous and laudable. Involving returning foreign fighters who have renounced ISIS 
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would be crucial to this campaign.59 The U.S. State Department’s campaign, “Think Again, Turn 
Away”, and the YouTube cartoon series by Average Mohamed are examples of anti-propaganda 
campaigns, but these have only had limited effect. Jigsaw, a Google-owned think tank, however 
has devised a strategy that is promising: the Redirect Method. The Redirect Method is a targeted 
advertising campaign that uses Google’s search advertising algorithms and YouTube to dissuade 
potential recruits from joining ISIS. Ads and YouTube clips that counter ISIS’ messages appear 
when individuals search certain keywords or phrases that Jigsaw has determined indicate a 
person may be attracted to the Islamic State. These include videos that deliberately contradict 
ISIS’ messages but also “‘hidden counter-argument content” that appears neutral.60  
Education should also involve creating curriculum in schools that teaches students about 
the Islamic State so that they have accurate information about the organization rather than 
information that comes solely from the media or the group itself. Curriculum that discusses Islam 
and its principles and makes clear that Islam is not singular and that the version of the religion 
that ISIS embraces is not popular or widespread is also crucial, as is countering the stereotype of 
Muslims as terrorists that is pervasive in the United States and other Western countries. This 
stereotype leads to discrimination and isolation of Muslims or people of Middle Eastern descent 
in these countries. ISIS targets individuals who experience discrimination based on their race, 
ethnicity, or religion, as this discrimination can create feelings of isolation or alienation from and 
resentment of society. To lessen these feelings and promote inclusivity, there must be a change 
in the prejudicial rhetoric promulgated by some key members of the U.S. administration, some 
media sites and news outlets, and other key figures. Since the 1990’s there has been a rise in 
right-wing extremism in the United States, which the election of Donald Trump in 2016 has 
exacerbated.61 President Trump’s election validated phenomena such as white supremacy, 
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racism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia as he was elected despite comments and actions that 
legitimized these beliefs. It is the responsibility of the education system and the media to refute 
these ideas and facilitate discussions on these topics. It is also the responsibility of President 
Trump and his administration to condemn these ideologies and to change the official discourse of 
the United States.  
Second, the United States and other Western governments must implement policies and 
programs that reduce discrimination and increase the inclusion of minorities in society. One such 
policy would build support networks to increase inclusion, which could reduce the number of 
individuals vulnerable to radicalization. Support networks include community organizations such 
as clubs, associations, and sports teams, as well as training programs and volunteering 
opportunities. These help integrate people into society and strengthen their connections with 
their community.62 People who lack a sense of meaning or purpose and who feel alienated from 
society are highly vulnerable to radicalization by an extremist group, particularly a terrorist 
group like ISIS that specifically targets these people. Getting vulnerable people involved in their 
community can make them feel more included and provide them with a sense of meaning and 
purpose.  
 Building support networks is an important aspect of decreasing marginalization, as is 
providing education and employment opportunities to minorities, particularly individuals of 
Middle Eastern descent. Working to eliminate discriminatory practices in education and 
employment are vital to combatting ISIS’ recruitment. Ratifying the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, a key international human rights treaty that guarantees 
non-discrimination in both education and employment, is a key step in this effort. Developing 
legislation that commits the United States to following this treaty and other international human 
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rights treaties is an important broad-scale step that the U.S. can take to reduce discrimination. 
This is not an immediate change, but overtime could make a large impact. A more inclusive 
country will make people feel more accepted and thus less vulnerable to radicalization and 
recruitment by ISIS.  
  Addressing the reasons that people join the Islamic State is a crucial method of 
combatting ISIS’ recruitment. Combining these methods with strategies that address the means 
of recruitment, such as restricting ISIS’ access to the internet and cutting off its funding 
capabilities, is an effective way to severely hamper ISIS’ ability to recruit, which will in turn 
hasten the group’s decline. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Future research could expand on this study by examining other explanations of ISIS’ 
recruitment and determining their validity. Such explanations include one-on-one recruitment, 
recruitment of psychopathic individuals, recruitment of individuals with criminal records, and 
recruitment of Western Muslim women. Research on these topics could reveal more information 
that could be used to devise additional strategies to counter ISIS’ recruitment and help lead to the 
defeat of the Islamic State. In addition, I relied on news stories for the information about the 
cases included in this study. Access to more and better resources would provide valuable 
information and could be used in future projects to evaluate both these explanations and those 
investigated in this study. Sources useful to this research would include interviews with current 
or past members of the Islamic State and with individuals who knew them well, including family 
members, friends, teachers, employers, and others. A database of extensive information on 
foreign fighters would be a valuable source as well. 
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Summary 
 Through the use of case studies this study suggests that ISIS relies heavily on targeting 
vulnerable individuals and siblings to recruit new members. Use of the internet plays a fairly 
large role in the radicalization and recruitment process. Hindering the Islamic State’s ability to 
recruit through long-term strategies that address the reasons why people join ISIS, including 
providing education, promoting inclusive rhetoric, and implementing policies and programs that 
decrease marginalization and reduce discrimination, can accelerate the decline of the group. 
These strategies are useful in fighting not only ISIS, but also other terrorist groups that currently 
exist and that will arise in the future. Even if the Islamic State is defeated, its ideas will still exist 
and a new organization will likely emerge in its stead. It is thus important to continue to research 
and study ways to defeat terrorist groups. Limiting the ability of a terrorist organization to recruit 
members is one such method on which further research should be conducted.  
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